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THE CONTINUUM OF STATE SOVEREIGNTY 
 A Commentary on African Elections 
By: K.C. O’Rourke1 
Abstract 
Twenty-six African States hold elections between 2016 and 
2017.2 More basic than campaign rhetoric and ethnocentric political 
jockeying, the state in Africa is ripe for a deeper engagement with 
notions of state sovereignty that are more relevant for this century as 
the African state seeks to exercise its core functions, protect its inter-
ests within its own geographic boundaries, and care for all of the 
people it seeks to govern. The intentional structuring of such a dia-
logue must be guided to secure the cornerstones of individual liberty 
and participatory democracy – two basic protective functions that 
uniquely belong to the nation-state. The functional components for 
the design of such a new social contract will need to be very different 
from the intra-State ethnocentric dynamics that regrettably continue 
to dominate Africa.  A continuum for sovereignty that is unique to the 
African nation-state context, not one that mirrors Westphalian no-
tions or reflects remnants of a postcolonial era, will be outlined here. 
This continuum of sovereignty incorporates a framework of liberty 
designed to bridge definitions of the nation state from the last century 
with new roles of sovereignty demanded in this century. It is the 
 
 1.  Dr. Karen A. Cecilia O’Rourke, J.D., M. Div., LL.M. holds a Doctorate of Juridical 
Science [S.J.D.] with a dual Masters of Law (LL.M.; International Law and Business ; 
Government Law & Regulation) from Washington College of Law, American Univer-
sity.  O’Rourke has taught as adjunct faculty at Washington College of Law, holds a 
Juris Doctorate from Drake University Law School, and serves in the core executive 
leadership circle at The Bridging Institute in Maryland. Interdisciplinary comments to 
the email listed here are welcomed and encouraged : GeoNOMOS777@gmail.com.  
 2.  Presidential and Legislative Elections in Africa in 2016, THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTE 
(2016), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-
content/uploads/2016/01/foresightafrica2016_fullreport.pdf. (describing presidential 
elections in 2016) and 2017 African Election Calendar, ELECTORAL INSTITUTE FOR 
SUSTAINABLE DEMOCRACY IN AFRICA, https://www/eisa.org.za/index.php/2017-
african-election-calendar (list of African elections scheduled to be held in 2107). 
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framework of liberty that by necessity also includes the principles of 
human dignity and mutual benefit, anchors a new functional defini-
tion of sovereignty measured in terms of how a state cares for its 
people, and designs an enterprise of law from within a broader civil 
society comprised of economic traders. 
Key Words: continuum for sovereignty, framework of liberty 
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Introduction 
Approximately twenty-six African states have scheduled elec-
tions in 2016 and 2017 representing a tremendous opportunity to con-
structively analyze efforts by African state-level public institutions to 
maintain democratic governance gains and to correlate strong public 
institutions, individual liberty, and democratic participation. For 
some, African democracy has been structurally stalled by a trend that 
reflects an “illiberal sort of pseudo-democracy in which the incum-
bent demonizes the opposition, exploits the power of the State to 
stack the electoral contest in his favor, and removes constraints on his 
power.” 3  Freedom House reports that only 59% of African nations 
are a “part free” or “free” country—down from 71% in 2008.4  This 
trend is particularly troublesome in Africa where public institutions 
are still fragile, economies have been weakened by downward trends 
in commodity prices, and corruption continues.5 
Citizen protests, election demands for stability in the public 
funding of social programs, prioritizing access to health care and ed-
ucation, and creating job opportunities— especially in urbanized set-
tings— though growing, reflect the realization that such goals still 
remain  aspirational and elusive.  The necessary legitimacy of state-
level core functions in the allocation of a country’s essential re-
sources for economic capital, social capital, and human capital devel-
opment programs is at the forefront as citizens continually express 
dissatisfaction with governance as it relates to measuring outcomes 
that matter to their daily lives. The operative mandates for the Afri-
can nation-state are reflected in various news stories concerning elec-
tions on the continent where state sovereignty is often manipulated, 
bruised, or perhaps even surrendered unnecessarily. 6  Multi-layer 
 
 3.  Political Reform Stalls: African Fragile Democracies, THE ECONOMIST (Aug. 20, 
2016), http://economist.com/news/leaders/200750319 (last visited Oct. 12, 2016). 
 4.  Id. (citing Freedom House research that shows only about 59% of sub-Saharan coun-
tries were “free” or “partly free” which is up from 39% in 1973 but down from 71% in 
2008). 
 5.  Id. (suggesting that on of the key issues is the notion that for many African national 
elections, the winner takes all the spoils of an election including total access to the 
natural resources and cash needed to remain in power; losing an election means being 
cut out of the spoils on a permanent basis). 
 6.  Henry Umoru & Joseph Erunke, Look Beyond APC, Set Up Special Squad to Rescue 
Nigeria From Economic Crisis, Ekweremadu Tells Buhari, VANGUARD (Sept. 11, 
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governance structures across many states may be constitutionally 
mandated, but such an intrastate framework fosters fragmentation.  It 
also presents some unique challenges for this analysis of African na-
tion-state sovereignty, the operations of which often remain uniquely 
and rigidly ethnocentric and are often elusive to the legitimacy of the 
African nation-state itself.7 These issues, often widely discussed and 
promoted in campaign rhetoric and “back room deals,” would best be 
addressed as a matter of policy consistently unified at the level of the 
nation-state.8 
State level lawmakers and African public officials are being con-
fronted in two ways during this election cycle. First, nation-states will 
need to redefine and secure the core function of the State from a dif-
 
2016), http://www.vanguardngr.com/2016/09/look-beyond-apc-set-up-special-squad-
to-rescue-nigeria-from-economic-crisis-ekweremadu-tells-buhari/ (last visited July 15, 
2017) See also SBM Intelligence, 2016 Nigeria Forecast : A Very Difficult Year, 
STRATFOR (Dec. 17, 2015), https://www.stratfor.com/the-hub/2016-nigeria-forecast-
very-difficult-year; see also Joe Mwansa Lombe Kaluba, Zambia’s 2016 Elections: 
The Aftermath, ZAMBIA REP. (Aug. 31, 2016), 
https://zambiareports.com/2016/08/31/zambias-2016-elections-the-aftermath/; 
Norimitsu Onishi, Zambia Votes Amid Economic Slowdown and Political Violence, 
N.Y.TIMES (Aug. 12, 2016), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/12/world/africa/zambia-election-lungu-
hichilema.html? ; Norimitsu Onishi, ANC Suffers Major Election Setback in South Af-
rica, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 5, 2016), http://nytimes.com/2016/08/06/world/africa/south-
africa-election-anc.html.; See also Mohammed Yusuf, Kenya Launches New Political 
Party, VOA NEWS (Sept. 10, 2016, 5:46 PM), www. voanews.com/a/Kenyan-
president-launches-political-party/3501765.html. 
 7.  Global Goals, African Realities: Building a Sustainable Future for ALL, AFRICA 
PROGRESS PANEL, 89 (2015), http://app-cdn.acwupload.co.uk/wp-
content/uploads/2015/09/APP_ExectuvieSummary_WEB.pdf (last visited July 
15,2017] [hereinafter referenced as “African Progress Report/Annan”] ; (Author not-
ing that the Constitutions of the four nation-states reviewed [South African, Kenya, 
Nigeria, and Zambia] have liberty deeply embedded within the Preamble and operative 
functions of their governance structures. Furthermore, the sense of liberty outlined in 
these founding documents is supportive of an affirmative engagement of the nation 
State to protect liberty, not merely a western notion of liberty “freedom from” actions 
by the State).  
 8.  Justice and equity and the benefits that accompany them are in the eyes of tens of mil-
lions of Africans still conspicuously absent in their lives because of poor State-level 
coordination and perceived lack of basic planning for food security, nutrition, educa-
tion and jobs. As the African middle class grows across the Continent, too many are 
being left behind. The lack of a productive future, absence of outlets for gainful em-
ployment, and lack of education for youth have grave future consequences which will 
span generations and further stratify society into conflicting classes. These issues dom-
inated the political rhetoric of the run up to 2016 elections and continued into the 2017 
cycle of elections. 
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ferent and deeper understanding of state sovereignty. This will allow 
nation-states to move past rigidly drawn ethnocentric and ideological 
lines fostered from within its own intra-state competitive and multi-
layered municipal, region, province, or council political processes. 
Second, the African State will need to reconsider its integration into 
the program pillars of the African Economic Community ( hereinaf-
ter,AEC). This regional AEC integration may have structurally pre-
vented the expansion of the nation-state between 1980-1990 in ways 
that limited it from defining its own sovereign role in a post-colonial 
era of the last century.9  Both dynamics have fragmented the capacity 
of the state to define the exercise of state sovereignty and to legiti-
mately secure its own role on the continent and in the world. 
 
 9.  Supra, Note 7, African Progress Report/Annan, at 15-28. See also Posner, D.N. and 
D.J. Young, ‘ The Institutionalization of Political Power in Africa”, Journal of Democ-
racy,[vol 18,No 3][2007][pages 126-140] [noting that in 47 sub-Saharan countries 
sampling 227 leaders, that around 70% of African leaders exited power through un-
constitutional means between 1970-1980 but this trend dropped to around 19% be-
tween 2000-2005 but all 18 directly elected who faced term limits heard strong de-
mands from their supporters to find a way to stay in power ; this review does not 
include the phenomenon of “crowd renting” which occurs often in African politics 
among African elite both civilian and military; 14 African presidents in that same time 
period  attempted constitutional amendments that allowed a third term through a par-
liamentary vote where that contender’s party already had legislative majority]; See al-
so Golder, Matt and Leonard Wantchekon, “ Africa: Dictatorial and Democratic Elec-
toral Systems since 1946”[August 17,2004] ; see at https: 
www.princeton.edu//~lwantche/Africa-Dictatorial_and_democratic_electoral-systems-
since-1946 [last visited March 21, 2017][ suggesting that the electoral experience in 
Africa became more widespread after World War II as French and British attempted to 
mollify emerging nationalist movements by permitting the establishment of electoral 
colleges[French] and parliamentary systems[British]; the result of widespread confu-
sion of fledgling multi-party systems was soon replaced by single party authoritarian 
government with dictatorships in the 1960s ; As democratic institutions continued to 
break down under the weight of regional and ethnic conflict, civil war and ethnic un-
rest, this instability was followed by a thirty year hiatus before multi-party electoral 
system design re-emerged after the Cold War ended and led to a high degree of politi-
cal fragmentation in the 1990s; ; pointing to the opposition boycotts between 1995-
1997 which clearly addressed patronage networks that were used to coopt opposition 
parties under single party rule. The colonial heritage of each country in turn, impacted 
majoritarian or proportional electoral institutions which in the end, were negotiated 
within various States on the Continent but  this overall ethnic fragmentation was based 
on a strategy that deliberately focused on rapid ethnic mobilization and geographically 
concentrated ethnic groups that promoted regional single interest political parties; sug-
gesting that this ethnic /regional fragmentation which continues today may lie at the 
heart of Africa’s growth tragedy] 
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Often, it appears that the African nation-state is left simply to be 
a conduit for economic development and contract management in the 
competition engendered and encouraged between various intra-state 
local governments, provinces and councils, municipal power brokers, 
and layers of conflicting rules of law, all operating from within dif-
ferent political subdivisions in the state itself and/or from  within var-
ious AEC regional economic pillars of the African Economic Com-
munity [hereinafter AEC].10 
This commentary sets out three areas for post-election reflection 
that call for a deeper level of state engagement concerning the legiti-
macy of sovereignty for the African nation-state which is unique his-
torically in many ways. First, a brief review is provided on current 
election cycles already in process in four nations – Kenya, Nigeria, 
South Africa and Zambia – and the deeper level of engagement by 
the African nation-state beyond rigid ethnocentric divisions that will 
be required at the national level to secure its own state legitimacy. 
Second, a focused summary is outlined on notions of state sovereign-
ty which have radically changed in the later part of the last century 
and into this century so much so that Westphalian notions of sover-
eignty, if ever applicable to Africa nation-states in the first place, are 
certainly no longer applicable to the complexity, role, and multi-
layered function of African states is this pre- election and post-
election cycle. Lastly, a functional continuum of sovereignty is de-
scribed that engages a deeper discussion about legitimate nature of 
state sovereignty as it relates to a framework of liberty, the core func-
tion of the State, and the social contract offered as part of these elec-
tion cycles to all the citizens the state seeks to govern. 
The proposed continuum of sovereignty  secures a deeper en-
gagement of African nation- state sovereignty so that the state oper-
ates within the framework of liberty which in turn anchors the core 
function of the state.  The proposed continuum of sovereignty out-
lined here moves beyond the matters of political elections and its cy-
clical rhetoric of “winner takes all”—meaning control of natural re-
sources and ethnic group dominance in geographic sub-regions of the 
State— to matters of overall state legitimacy. The core functions of 
 
 10.  Id. (noting there needs to be a serious rethinking process around energy, health, and 
economic development in Africa at the level of the nation-state so that long-term na-
tional interests can overcome political corruption and private gain). 
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the state, justice and equity, are depicted along this proposed contin-
uum for sovereignty.11  The continuum functions within a precise 
framework of liberty. There are triangular relationships underlying 
election campaign rhetoric about justice, equity and gainful employ-
ment; between empowerment of equal opportunity and human rights; 
and the indispensable operation of a nation-state legitimately acting 
as sovereign. 12  These statewide matters, which must be addressed, 
do not devolve or dilute the constitutional mandates for multi-level 
governance unique to Africa nation-states.  The discussion simply 
 
 11.  The continuum of sovereignty proposed from within the single core function of the 
sovereign state is presented in this article as a possible starting point for transformative 
conversation because the state would consistently balance all essential capital re-
sources: economic, social, and human capital development and utilization.A continu-
um is referenced as the basis of this new typology for sovereignty because it represents 
a more flexible set of options given the range of possibilities in terms of how an indi-
vidual state interacts with some sense of legitimacy on behalf of the people it is gov-
erning and interacts as a member of the international community of states. There is no 
limit to the possibilities offered as part of this proposal for a continuum of state sover-
eignty so long at it operates within a framework of liberty. See diagram and discussion 
detailed in this commentary. See continuum, https://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/continuum (October 12, 2016). An extensive literature review 
has informed the development of the proposed continuum of state sovereignty includ-
ing a state’s single core functions as outlined and its direct partnership with its people 
as part of the radical transformation of the twenty-first century state. See generally 
ANATOLE KALETSKY, CAPITALISM 4.0: THE BIRTH OF A NEW ECONOMY IN THE 
AFTERMATH OF CRISIS (2010); Steven Menashi, Ethno-nationalism and Liberal De-
mocracy, 32 U. Pa. J. Int’l L. 57 (2010); G. Palombella & N. Walker, eds., 
RELOCATING THE RULE OF LAW (2009); Timothy William Waters, The Momentous 
Gravity of the State of Things Now Obtaining: Annoying Westphalian Objections to 
the Idea of Global Governance, 16 Ind. J. Global Legal Stud. 25 (2009); Peer 
Zumbansen, Law After the Welfare State: Formalism, Functionalism and the Ironic 
Turn of Reflexive Law, 56 Am. J. Comp. L. 769 (2008); Ivan Manokha, The Political 
Economy of Human Rights Enforcement (2008); James Rosenau, Three Steps Toward 
a Viable Theory for Globalization, Frontiers of Globalization Research: Theoretical 
and Methodological Approaches (Ina Rossi, ed., 2007). See also Saskia Sassen, A 
SOCIOLOGY OF GLOBALIZATION (2007); Eric Alan Engle, Transformation of the Inter-
national Legal Order, 23 Quinnipiac  L.Rev.23 (2007); John Allan Cohen, Sovereignty 
in a Postmodern World, 18 Fla. J. Int’l L. 907, 908-913 (2007); Tanja A. Börzel and 
Thomas Risse, Public-Private Partnerships: Effective and Legitimate Tools of Interna-
tional Governance, in COMPLEX SOVEREIGNTY: RECONSTITUTING POLITICAL 
AUTHORITY IN THE TWENTY –FIRST CENTURY (E. Grands & L.W. Pauly, eds., 2005); 
Paul Kahn, The Question of Sovereignty, 40 Stan J. Int’l L. 259, 260-268 (2004); 
Anne-Marie Slaughter, A New World Order (2004); See also Brad R. Roth, The En-
during Significance of State Sovereignty, 56 Fla.L.Rev.1017 (2004); Eric Allen Engle, 
The Transformation of the International Legal System: The Post-Westphalian Legal 
Order, 23 Q.L.R. 23 (2004). 
 12.  Supra, Note 7, African Progress Report/Annan, at 93. 
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raises the bar of the true nature and function of the nation State.  Not 
all inequalities documented across various African states are unjusti-
fied.  However, the current and well documented scope, and level of 
injustice and inequality are unjustified and unfair – they truly repre-
sent an impediment to the function of liberty. 
This commentary supports the premise that it is the nation-state, 
not regional AEC economic configurations, or intra-State competitive 
regions, provinces, councils or municipalities that must remain the 
primary architect of world order.  Corporations, transnational entities 
[public and private] also do not have the capacity or capability to pro-
tect individual liberty or promote participatory democracy. This 
unique duty belongs alone to the nation-state as a whole. The time is 
ripe for serious consideration of constructing a continuum of sover-
eignty during the 2018-2020 post-election period, and for outlining a 
new zeal for democracy succinctly articulated to address some of the 
alarming downward trending in relation to participatory democracy 
and individual liberty on the African continent. 
These matters of State legitimacy and sovereignty cannot be left 
to evolve from within a global marketplace, regional AEC pillar pro-
grams, private or public sector foreign economic development part-
nerships, or private sector commodity exchanges where short term 
economic gain is paramount and competes with the overall interests 
of the nation state.  At times, these economic partnerships appear in-
tentionally designed to supplant the legitimacy of the nation state al-
together.  Nor can the components of sovereign legitimacy be secured 
from within the volatile nature of political rhetoric and campaign 
promises falsely and expediently made along ethnic lines to secure 
swing votes. 
The application of this proposed continuum of sovereignty could 
be part of the post-election political dialogue process over the next 
twenty-four months as the country strives to fight against instances of 
persistent and burning social injustices and prepares for the next cy-
cles of elections in 2020-2022.  This post-election dialogue process 
would clearly document African nation-states marshalling and devel-
oping its three essential capital resources in support of domestic pro-
grams that involve economic marketplace issues, social safety net-
works, labor regulation, job creation, and individual capability or 
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individual resource development.13  The balance  needed points to a 
much more deliberate, well-defined, coordinated, focused, and inten-
tional approach in the State’s development and utilization of econom-
ic capital, social capital, and human capital.14  From this continuum of 
sovereignty, it is the nation-state that is uniquely positioned to design 
and direct the core functions of democracy, build strong public insti-
tutions, coordinate long term strategic development at various multi-
level governance structures, design new economic organizing princi-
ples that manage systemic risk, and address social security programs. 
 
 13.  Supra, Note 7, African Progress Report /Annan at 59-65 [noting that issues for green 
revolution in Africa are uniquely situated from with the nation State’s core function 
and include the following: Government equity targets are needed to be sure wealth dis-
tribution closes opportunity gaps that exist; Green revolution will require a different 
level of partnerships between States, global interests and private investors with goal to  
double African agricultural production; States to work to take the profit out of plunder 
–lumber and fishing; States must close the gap in infrastructure and inclusive financing 
[ includes more balanced perceptions of risk];Tax evasions by multinational corpora-
tions caused by regional configurations requires disclosure of financial operations, lists 
of subsidiaries and tax payments; and nation States publish all tax exemptions given to 
private domestic and transnational corporations – this becomes huge issue when cor-
porations operate across nation State jurisdictions 
 14. Economic capital is the quantum of risk capital, assessed on a real basis, which an en-
terprise requires to cover the risks that it is running or collecting as a going concern, 
such as market risk, credit risk, legal risk, and operational risk. See 
http://www.glynholton.com/2013/06/economic_capital [Last visited on July 15, 2017].  
The term social capital generally refers to (a) resources, and the value of these re-
sources, both tangible (public spaces, private property) and intangible (“actors,” “hu-
man capital,” persons and people) but is in the GeoNOMOS Model©  to be distin-
guished from human capital, (b) the relationships among these resources, and (c) the 
impact that these relationships have on the resources involved in each relationship, and 
on larger groups.  The focus of social capital is generally as a form of capital that pro-
duces public goods for a common good.  Human capital is a term popularized by Gary 
Becker, an economist from the University of Chicago, and Jacob Mincer that refers to 
the stock of knowledge, habits, social and personality attributes, including creativity, 
embodied in the ability to perform labor so as to produce economic value. In the alter-
native, human capital is understood as a collection of resources – all the knowledge, 
talents, skills, abilities, experience, intelligence, training, judgment, and wisdom pos-
sessed individually and collectively by individuals in a particular and defined popula-
tion.  Such resources are the total capacity of the people that represents a form of 
wealth which can be directed to accomplish the goals of the nation or state or a portion 
thereof.  
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Current Political Elections Cycles: Fragmentation of State 
Sovereignty and Regional Neoliberal Economic Pressures 
This section briefly discusses the pre-election and post-election 
issues of four nations— Kenya, Nigeria, South Africa and Zambia—
where there is a constitutional and common law foundation that in-
cludes working experience in support of civic society and public in-
stitutions for the preservation of democracy and government func-
tion. These four countries are completing their 2016-2017 political 
election cycles and under tremendous economic pressure from within 
the AEC. After almost a century of working to move past the effects 
and aftermath of colonialism, these four nation-states are grappling 
with redefining state sovereignty in a new period of political transi-
tion, uncertainty, pre-and-post-election turmoil, and public contesta-
tion. 
The emergence of a new consumer class across Africa in the past 
decade, as well as growth and investment in the service sector, fueled 
hopes of sustained economic expansion on the continent.15  But re-
cently, the quick downturn in many of Africa’s fastest growing econ-
omies suggests how much of the impressive growth in the past dec-
ade and a half was still being driven by a boom in commodities.16  
These trends are not lost in the political rhetoric of this campaign cy-
cle either.  Much of the local level political jockeying is over the con-
trol of resources and commodities for economic development (and 
the likely personal gain of those politicians who espouse such a cam-
paign issues).17  This type of political jockeying sometimes clashes 
with citizen demands for better social and human capital develop-
ment related to justice and equity in programs that in turn support 
 
 15.  Supra note 7, African Progress Report /Annan at 42- 53 (noting Diversification efforts 
by Nigeria into a film industry helps stabilize economic growth (42); Reporting that 
Nigeria (6.96 %) and Zambia (6.95%) are in top 20 fastest African growing economies 
in the world (2008-2015) (52;53). However, the focus needs to be on wellbeing for the 
many and not just wealth for a few). 
 16.  See Norimitsu Onishi, China’s Slowdown Tarnishes Economic Boom in Copper-Rich 
Zambia, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 2, 2015) 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/03/world/africa/zambia-china-economic-
slow-
down.html?action=click&contentCollection=Africa&module=RelatedCoverage&regio
n=Marginalia&pgtype=article (last visited July 15, 2017). 
 17.  Id.  
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better access to education, health, and job opportunities across the en-
tire state.18 
Trending at the structural level of municipality and provincial 
multi-layered processes is important too, but setting better policy pro-
jection and planning milestone at the state level for governance of the 
entire country is key for a sovereign state to secure its own legitima-
cy, stability, and continuity for all people it seeks to govern.  Kenya, 
where tensions and fears of violence are rising, had 2017 political 
elections.19  Local political processes were continually challenged for 
fraudulent practices as the new 2016 Jubilee Party sought to consoli-
date twelve political parties across this nation-state based on promis-
es of fairness and transparency in primary elections processes fueling 
a longstanding dispute on the effectiveness of open democracy prac-
tices.20 
 
 18.  Id.  
 19.  See M.Yusuf, Kenya Launches New Political Party, GLOBAL SECURITY.ORG, (Sep-
tember 10,2016) http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/news/2016/09/mil-
160910-voa02.htm (last visited July 15, 2017) (reporting that Kenya’s president 
launched a new political party that he intends to use for a second and last term in of-
fice in the 2017 election. The launch of the Jubilee Party followed days of political 
haggling in Nairobi as 12 parties dissolved and united under the new organization. In 
1966, three years after Kenya gained independence, the biggest two political parties, 
the Kenya African National Union and the Kenya African Democratic Union, merged. 
The unity, political commentators said, followed years of ethnic nationalization. 
Twenty-five years after that agreement, some politicians and activists took to the 
streets, demanding multiparty democracy. Then in late 2007, political violence erupted 
after incumbent President Mwai Kibaki won elections and was sworn into office. A 
power-sharing agreement in early 2008 ended the crisis. In this election cycle, Deputy 
President William Ruto told party delegates that multiparty democracy had contributed 
to intercommunal fighting in Kenya during elections representing a tower of burden 
making democracy chaotic); see also Kenya Election and Political Process Strengthen-
ing Program, USAID (Feb 2014 report) 
https://www.usaid.gov/documents/1860/kenya-election-and-political-process-
strengthening (last visited July 15, 2017) (program funded $USD 23.2 million to sup-
port and train with technical assistance Kenya’ Independent Electoral and Boundaries 
Commission that equipped 20,000 civil society leaders to convene 46,256 Kenyans to 
engage in Constitutional reform and peaceful 2013 elections; also registered to vote 
14.3 million voters in 30-day program). 
 20.   Allan Mungai, Aspirants Mount Kenya Region Threaten to Quit Jubilee Party, THE 
STANDARD, (August 22, 2016 8:07 GMT)  
http://www.standardmedia.co.ke/article/2000212918/over-50-aspirants-in-mt-kenya-
region-threaten-to-quit-jubilee-party (last visited July 15, 2017) (reporting that politi-
cal aspirants in Mt. Kenya region have threatened to ditch Jubilee Party over biased 
representation at the September 10 delegates’ conference. The over 50 political hope-
fuls, who are part of the Aspirants Caucus, say they would seek other options as they 
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Zambia was one of the first African nations to make a democrat-
ic transition in 1991.21  The recent narrow election of Edgar Lungu 
followed a campaign marred with harassment of the opposing parties, 
street protests, and allegations of vote rigging.22  Zambia’s election 
promises reflect the need for a new social contract with citizens that 
would place emphasis on more consistent and sustainable domestic 
infrastructures and employment opportunities.23  For the past decade, 
 
fear the nomination process would be flawed. Among the parties that folded is the 
Grand National Union, which sponsored Nyeri Governor Nderitu Gachagua in the last 
General Election. On Friday, Gachagua, whose GNU party is among those that have 
agreed to fold to join JP, said the nomination process would be conducted in a free and 
fair manner. He however, voiced his support for the proposal by the Parliamentary Se-
lect Committee on election commission to bar individuals who lose in party nomina-
tions from decamping to other parties. But Gichohi said that party-hopping was mainly 
caused by irregularities in primaries. “Jubilee Party was formed to foster unity in the 
country but if the nomination process is not all-inclusive and handled democratically, 
the party will fall short of its mandate,” he said. Others who have voiced their skepti-
cism that the nomination process would be biased are Meru Governor Peter Munya, 
who decamped from the Kiraitu Murungi-led Alliance Party of Kenya (APK) to the 
Party of National Unity (PNU) after APK expressed its intention to join the Jubilee 
Party).  
 21.  Supra, Note 3. 
 22.  Peter Adamu, Zambia’s 2016 Elections: The Aftermath (Aug. 31, 2016), 
https://zambiareports.com/2016/08/31/zambias-2016-elections-the-aftermath/ (noting 
Zambia’s political system boasts to be a multiparty democracy and that being such 
means there is competition among political opponents; noting that in contemporary 
politics, democracy must always win and if Zambia wants to see a much consolidated 
democracy, the people should come first; noting that in this year’s elections from the 
nomination day through the campaign period and up to the voting day, people have 
learned or are still learning a lot of things for the first time in the history of Zambia’s 
democratic era; suggesting the past three months more or less have been characterized 
with a lot of democratic challenges and lessons. Just like in every competition individ-
uals, political parties, Civil Society Organizations (CSOs), the media, professional 
bodies, law enforcement agencies, traditional leaders, and Faith Based Organizations 
(FBOs) among others have found themselves in what was termed as ‘Chamaeleon 
Challenge’ meaning a lot of emotions and finger pointing in different directions that 
kept changing; concluding there is only one Zambia and only one Nation, asking the 
people of Zambia, regardless of  individual or organizational political affiliation, to 
work hard to make that One Zambia One Nation work; calling on Zambia people espe-
cially on social media to do their part to promote that One Zambia One Zambia. Being 
Emotional, Hypocritical or Threats will not help the process toward One Zambia One 
Nation). 
 23.  Norimitsu Onishi, Zambia Votes Amid Economic Slowdown and Political Violence, 
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 11, 2016), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/12/world/africa/zambia-election-lungu-
hichilema.html?_r=0 (Zambia’s economy remains highly dependent on a single com-
modity, copper, which makes up more than 70 percent of the country’s exports. But 
plunging prices and decreasing demand from China, Zambia’s main export market, 
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Zambia, a copper-rich nation in southern Africa, appeared to have 
been one of the continent’s success stories; a stable democracy that 
enjoyed rapid economic growth thanks to China’s ravenous demand 
for Zambia’s main commodity, copper.24  But, with a slowdown in 
consumption of this commodity in China, decreased demand for cop-
per, and a collapse in prices, Zambia’s economy tumbled based on its 
lack of diversification, which in turn contributed to a political cam-
paign season punctuated by killings and widespread violence.25 
South Africa, despite its model Constitution, has been tarnished 
by president Jacob Zuma, who has worked to diminish public institu-
 
have led to the closing of mines and the loss of thousands of jobs. An acute power 
shortage, resulting from an El Niño-induced drought and mismanagement of its water 
resources, deepened the country’s economic woes. Zambia is now in talks with the In-
ternational Monetary Fund for a bailout. Mr. Lungu’s government has agreed on 
measures to control spending, including cutting back on fuel and electricity subsidies 
— though only after the elections. Despite such economic problems, the main presi-
dential contenders campaigned on promises to increase spending on infrastructure, 
health and education). 
 24.  Id. 
 25.  Supra, Note 23, (ONishi reports that millions of Zambians went to the polls on to 
elect a president and national lawmakers, amid warnings that the campaign violence 
could reduce turnout. The main contest, pitting President Edgar Lungu against a 
wealthy businessman, Hakainde Hichilema, was considered too close to call. It was a 
replay of a 2015 special election that Mr. Lungu won by a slim margin to complete the 
term of President Michael Sata, who died suddenly in October 2014; in a region 
known for presidents brutally clinging to office for decades, Zambia had smooth elec-
tions and transfers of power since 1991, long before multiparty democracies emerged 
elsewhere on the continent. But a handful of people have been killed and many others 
injured in recent political violence. Observers have attributed the violence to the two 
main parties, the Patriotic Front of Mr. Lungu and the United Party for National De-
velopment of Mr. Hichilema. On Tuesday, Esau E. Chulu, the chairman of the Elec-
toral Commission, said that the violence was “unprecedented and has marred Zambia’s 
historic record of peaceful elections.”); see also, Notimitsu Onishi, Zambia Economic 
Slowdown, N.Y.TIMES (Dec. 03, 2015), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/03/world/africa/zambia-china-economic- slow-
down.html?%20%5blast%20visited%20August%2022,%202016%5d%20action=click
&contentCollection=Africa&module=RelatedCoverage&region=Marginalia&pgtype=
article (suggesting that  60% of population  in Zambia is considered poor and 42% liv-
ing in absolute poverty; while Zambia is seeking to regionally diversify in agriculture 
,e.g., maize production but copper is still king and the State depends heavily on copper 
mining royalties from China; Zambia does have a strong legal environment and in-
vestment guarantee system giving it a bit of a competitive edge; campaign promises 
this season offers agricultural diversification, infrastructure projects with correction of 
corrupt practices, and job creation; reporting that the emergence of a new consumer 
class across Africa in the past decade, as well as growth and investment in the service 
sector, fueled hopes of sustained economic expansion on the continent). 
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tions, especially those dealing with corruption.26  Arguments contin-
ued throughout the August 2016 election process and were focused 
on barriers within political processes at the municipal level where 
ethnic disputes and political ramifications impact the power and func-
tion of the nation-state overall.27  Municipal elections from August 
2016 in South Africa saw the African National Congress lose control 
of several major cities to an alternative power group called the Dem-
ocratic Alliance.28  In South Africa, the African National Congress 
 
 26.  Supra, Note 3, Africa’s Fragile Democracies. 
 27.  Rapula Moatshe, ANC to Fight to Bitter End for Joburg, IOL (Aug. 20, 2016), 
http://www.iol.co.za/news/politics/anc-to-fight-to-bitter-end-for-joburg-2059276 (not-
ing that The ANC won 43 seats in the North-West city against the combined opposi-
tion’s 46 and was expected to lose the Johannesberg council despite having received 
the most votes. The Johannesberg council was to meet on Monday to elect a speaker 
and mayor in what is likely to be a tense affair after the ill-tempered first sitting in 
Tshwane, where newly minted DA mayor Solly Msimanga was heckled by ANC 
councilors during his maiden speech. Solly Msimanga, who did not get a mayoral 
chain, wasted no time in highlighting some of the sweeping changes that would be in-
troduced under the DA rule and his watch in the next five years. The newly elected 
mayor said the city would ban blue-light brigades within the metropolitan area and ex-
pected even President Jacob Zuma to abide by this law once it had been implemented. 
Msimanga warned people who would want to make the city ungovernable: “We are 
saying to you that we are watching you,” he said. To those who had been waiting for 
title deeds, he promised to deliver them in no time. He said gone were the days when 
city officials would get to their offices and sleep. EFF councillor Benjamin Disoloane 
told the DA to make sure that in Tshwane there were no racists and white supremacy. 
“We support you, but we are not part of you,” he told the mayor. Disoloane said the 
EFF was tired of seeing the ANC dispatching the Red Ants security to evict poor peo-
ple and dismantle their shacks.”We are going to teach the ANC how to become the 
opposition, so please behave yourself. You (the speaker) are not going to become 
Baleka Mbete,” he said.); see also, AFB (Nov. 09), 
http://www.africanews.com/2016/09/11/south-africa-s-johannesburg-mayor-vows-to-
cut-unemployment-rate/ (The change of control in Johannesburg dealt a humiliating 
blow to the ANC Mashaba entered politics in 2014 and began a rapid rise to power 
that has attracted criticism over his lack of experience in both politics and local gov-
ernment administration. He has however pledged to root out corruption and has set a 
target of 5 per cent annual economic growth. “If unemployment is still over 20 per-
cent, please, don’t give me a second chance. I would have failed you. Get someone 
else,” said Mashaba. The new mayor also said he plans use the five years of his term to 
implement the DA’s manifesto and ensure that the city is run like a professional civil 
service. The Democratic Alliance won 27 per cent of the vote in the local elections and 
is keen on further broadening its appeal ahead of presidential elections in 2019). 
 28.  Norimitsu Onishi, ANC Suffers Major Election Setback in South Africa, N. Y. TIMES 
(Mar. 6, 2017, 10:49AM), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/06/world/africa/south-
africa-election-anc.htm (The African National Congress, the party that helped liberate 
black South Africans from white-minority rule but has become mired in corruption, 
endured its worst election since taking power after the end of apartheid. The A.N.C., 
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[hereinafter ANC] struggled to consolidate power in 2016 by signing 
a coalition agreement with the Botho Community Movement [herein-
after BCM].29 The agreement, an example of ANC political drift, was 
mirrored in the local election in the Johannesburg municipality.  The 
growing contestation occurring from within South Africa as a nation-
state is exemplified by municipal leaders who continually dictate 
specific geographic-based rules of law that the state is mandated to 
respect, even when these rules are detrimental to another municipal 
area in the state.30  All these issues impact state sovereignty, the legit-
imacy of governance, constitutional integrity, cohesion, and the 
state’s core function in the twenty-first century. 
After many decades of election cycles and a history also marred 
by military rule, civil unrest, strife and war, Nigeria transitions from 
its first elected civilian government of Jonathan Goodluck.31 Good-
luck had his challenges to bring order, stability, and planning to the 
political process and for the benefit if its citizenry.  Nevertheless, in 
2016, he completed a subsequent and peaceful transition to a newly 
 
the party of the nation’s liberation hero and first black president, Nelson Mandela, 
could once count on the unyielding loyalty of tens of millions of black South Africans 
who lived under apartheid. But widespread anger over the stagnant economy and the 
brazen self-enrichment of the A.N.C.’s members have badly eroded the party’s stand-
ing, gradually chipping away at its ability to rack up big electoral victories on the basis 
of its history alone. In the biggest shake-up of the nation’s post-apartheid political or-
der, the A.N.C. lost power in at least one big black-majority city, Nelson Mandela 
Bay, for the first time. The main beneficiary of widespread dissatisfaction in the coun-
try was the Democratic Alliance, a political party that was traditionally led by white 
South Africans who opposed apartheid but now has many young black leaders. During 
the campaign, the A.N.C. attacked the Democratic Alliance as a Trojan horse for white 
interests). 
 29.  African News Agency, ANC Sings Coalition with BCM to Consolidate Power in Rus-
tenberg, THE CITIZEN (Mar. 6, 2017, 11:13AM), http://citizen.co.za/news/news-
national/1259394/anc-signs-coalition-with-bcm-to-consolidate-power-in-rustenburg/. 
 30.  Takalani Samuel Mashau, et. al., The Relationship between Traditional Leaders and 
Rural Local Municipalities in South Africa: With Special Reference to Legislations 
Governing Local Government, STUD TRIBES TRIBALS, 12(2): 219-225 (2014), 
http://www.krepublishers.com/02-Journals/T%20&%20T/T%20&%20T-12-0-000-14-
Web/T%20&%20T-12-2-000-14-ABST-PDF/S-T&T-12-2-219-14-345-Mashau-T-
S/S-T&T-12-2-219-14-345-Mashau-T-S-Tx[4].pdf. 
 31.  Nigeria’s Goodluck Jonathan, Profile of a Defeated President, BBC NEWS (Mar. 6, 
2017, 11:13AM), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-12192152; Katy Lee, Nige-
ria’s High-Stakes Presidential Elections: A Very Basic Guide, VOX (Mar. 6, 2017, 
11:13AM), http://www.vox.com/2015/3/28/8305235/nigeria-elections-basic-guide. 
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elected governing body.32  Despite this effort, the religious discrimi-
nation, senatorial district bias, propaganda, unfounded rumors and in-
tra-political party clashes have largely found prominence in the state 
politics.33  These disputes arising under the disguise of equal repre-
sentation are often deeply rooted in ethnocentric bias either at geo-
political zone, state, senatorial district, local government, or ward 
levels.  This concept is the major factor driving the emergence of po-
litical or non-political office holders at all levels in Nigeria – only 
when there has been a promised element of economic “spoils” flow-
ing from the election then, this “equal representation” argument can 
richly endow the candidate, their place of origin or their place of res-
idence.34  In Nigeria, 50% of the population living in urban areas live 
 
 32.  Mark Green, Nigeria Political Transition Sets Model for African Elections, THE HILL 
(Mar. 6, 2017, 2:59PM), 
http://thehill.com/blogs/pundits-blog/international/243402-nigerian-political-transition-sets-
model-for-other-african. 
 33.  Kunle Ajayi, Ondo Election 2016: The Politics of Mad Men With Hoes Syndrome , 
PM NEWS NIGERIA (Mar. 6, 2017, 3:09PM), 
https://www.pmnewsnigeria.com/2016/08/25/ondo-election-2016-the-politics-of-mad-men-
with-hoes-syndrome/. 
 34.  Kunle Ajayi, Ondo Election 2016: The Politics of Man Men With Hoes Syndromes 
(Aug. 26, 2016), http://www.pmnewsnigeria.com/2016/08/25/ondo-election-2016-the-
politics-of-mad-men-with-hoes-syndrome (suggesting the intrigues that has enveloped 
the politics leading to the emergence of the next Governor of Ondo State. The truth be 
told, this is not only peculiar to Ondo state but to almost all political wards in the 
country and surprisingly the nation as a whole. The emergence of a presidential candi-
date from one geo-political zone is often negotiated with a political calculation to pick 
a running mate from another geo-political zone to appeal to electorates for block votes. 
Disguised as equal representation, this concept in our politics is what I call “The Mad 
Men with Hoes Syndrome”. There is an adage in the south western part of Nigeria 
“When you give a hoe to a mad man, he will definitely make the heaps between his 
legs”. Most political office holders in Nigeria are guilty of this syndrome as it is evi-
dent in the distribution of the commonwealth at the local government, state or national 
levels. More visible development goes to the local government or hometown of the 
most prominent politician in the area); see also Henry Umoru & J.Erunke, Look Be-
yond APC: Set Up Special Squad to Rescue Nigeria From Economic Crisis (Sept.11, 
2016), http://www.vanguardngr.com/2016/09/look-beyond-apc-set-up-special-squad-
to-rescue-nigeria-from-economic-crisis-ekweremadu-tells-buhari/ (Senate President 
Ike Ekweremadu urged President Muhammadu Buhari to in the spirit of Eid- Kabir 
celebration look beyond the ruling All Progressives Congress, APC and constitute a 
Special Economic Squad to rescue the country from the present economic meltdown. 
In his Eid-El Kabir message to the Muslim Ummah, Senator Ekweremadu also called 
on all Muslims to use the occasion of the Eid-El Kabir to pray for the nation’s quick 
recovery from her current economic recession, expressing confidence that Nigerians, 
working together, could heal the nation’s economy. According to the statement which 
was signed by his Special Adviser Media and Publicity, Uche Anichukwu, the Deputy 
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in poverty.  Income inequality is a continuous political election issue 
because 10% of the population accounts for twice the income of the 
poorest 40%.35 
However, Kenya, Nigeria, South Africa and Zambia are consist-
ently confronting problems linked to urbanization where broad based 
human development (human capital) gains are made only when 
available employment for those incoming residents is coupled with 
equitable distribution of infrastructure support and basic services. 36  
Ethnocentric and religious rivalry that promotes personal gain in poli-
tics for the region, municipal, province or council level of intra-state 
 
Senate President who noted that prayers alone, was not enough since Islam advocates 
both Work and Prayer, stressed that the present economic challenges were not beyond 
redemption, but could actually become the nation’s turning point away from an oil-
driven economy to real prosperity if the right policies and structures were put in place. 
Noting his warning long ago that elections had come and gone there would be a need 
to move from politics to governance, Ekweremadu noted it is time for governance that 
must bring all capable hands on the deck, irrespective of political, religious or ethnic 
backgrounds); see also 2016 Nigeria Forecast : A Very Difficult Year (Dec. 17, 2015), 
https://www.stratfor.com/the-hub/2016-nigeria-forecast-very-difficult-year (noting the 
challenges can be surmounted with the right planning; openness, so that the people of 
Nigeria are prepared for those challenges; and political will, in order to steer the coun-
try through the trying times. While the legal system is speedily reformed to ensure re-
dress of the perceived massive looting and stealing of the past (President Jonathan led) 
government, the President Buhari led government should quickly quit the blame game 
as the 180 million citizens and daily population additions will become impatient once 
Year 2016 bills start coming up. With the exposure to social media and ghost radio sta-
tions, a one-man riot will quickly turn to a one million-man riot. 2016 was a promising 
year for Nigeria despite these challenges. The economic challenges are global and Ni-
geria has a young population which creates great opportunity for labour. With the right 
policies and quick implementation, Nigeria will witness a surge in local production 
and reopening of small scale manufacturing centers, greater emphasis on food pro-
cessing and industrial farming).  
 35.  Office for Economic and Cooperative Development, African Economic Outlook 2015: 
Regional Development and Spatial Inclusion, http://www.oecd-
ilibrary.org/development/african-economic-outlook-
2015/summary/english_03d0e741-en?isSummaryOf=/content/book/aeo-2015-en, 
(suggesting that gender inequality in Nigeria is directly related to maternal mortality 
rates, low percentage of women in parliament and low labor force participation rates 
for women).  
 36.   Supra, note 7, African Progress Report /Annan at 85 (noting that Nigeria has strong 
labor policies and a national poverty reduction strategy that it often partners with ex-
penditures plans and revenue sharing strategies but the core function of the state will 
need to better focus on future infrastructure development for roads, schools, IT, water 
and electric systems. So, while Nigeria is urbanizing, improvements in rule of law, 
safety, political violence and corruption must simultaneously occur. Nigeria set a Sov-
ereign Wealth Fund with clear and transparent procedures for managing the ongoing 
flow and growth cycles tied to its natural resources).  
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political structures impedes the overall function of state sovereignty.  
Without the active design in the support of the core function of the 
state to balance all its capital resources, the African state will expand 
disparities as rural poverty is simply transferred to urban areas.  Cor-
rection of this “urbanization exacerbation” during the post-election 
process, will at least in part require more openly accountable govern-
ance processes at all levels of the nation-state.  A fair distribution 
system for better coordinated state-wide infrastructure expansions 
will need to reflect a human rights approach – an approach that is 
deeply embedded in the continuum for state sovereignty outlined in 
this commentary.37 
The point is made from review of the pre and post-election cy-
cles in these four countries that a new dialogue concerning African 
nation-state sovereignty and state legitimacy is needed on a systems 
basis.  Multi-layers of political structures in these four nation-states 
reflect large numbers of local governments, councils, municipalities, 
regions or provinces drawn along historically rigid ethnic lines, some 
of which operate quasi-independently of the state and at times even 
compete regionally and globally against each other and the legitima-
 
 37.  Supra, note 28 at 111, (Suggesting that a human rights based approach would look to 
develop and increasing public capacity for urban sustainability and population securi-
ty, private sector investment tied to job creation, and social protection of worker 
rights; and participatory organizations around issues of resource allocation); See also, 
OECD Warning African Urbanization May Not Yet Be Sustainable (May 24, 2016), 
http://www.economywatch.com/news/OECD-Warning-African-Urbanization-May-
Not-Yet-Be-Sustainable0524.html (last visited September 11,2016). (The Organization 
for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) published its most recent Afri-
can Economic Outlook and warned that although Africa has been urbanizing at an un-
precedented rate, it must take steps to ensure that that process remains sustainable or it 
could lead to enormous economic collapses. Since 1995, the population of Africans 
living in cities has doubled to a record high of 472 million as of 2015. At that rate, the 
OECD opines, two-thirds of the African population will live in cities by 2050. Suc-
cessful urbanization requires infrastructure and social transformations, however, and 
the OECD does not see changes at a comparable rate. From an infrastructure stand-
point, these nations will also need to create safer and more diverse neighborhoods. 
They should also promote public transit, waste collection, more reliable utilities, and 
city planning and building codes that consider the effects of climate change. As noted 
by the OECD’s report, poor planning leads to costly urban sprawl and rapid decay. Af-
rica, as a whole, remained the second fastest growing region for economic develop-
ment, second only to Asia. In 2015, the region experienced 3.6% growth, a rate that is 
more than double the growth rate for Europe. The OECD’s report anticipates the re-
gion’s growth rate rising to 4.5% in 2017. That is despite the slump in commodity 
prices that has heavily impacted nations like Nigeria). 
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cy of their own nation-state.38  This intra-state tension also impacts 
the legitimacy of state sovereignty and governance as the state inter-
acts from within long-standing regional AEC program pillars, state 
constitution and regulatory variations, and pressures to implement a 
single market commodity development program for the continent.39  
In other words, there appears to be a disconnect at the state level to 
consistently engage and balance the interface and interlocking rela-
tionships required between the multiple governance layers within the 
state. 
While it is important not to discourage the use or creation of 
multi-national, transnational, or regional organizations, the fragmen-
tation of the current AEC regional practices on the continent also im-
pact the nation-state’s control over its three essential capital re-
sources: diluting the state’s sovereign role as it continues to be caught 
between the historic rigidity of ethnocentric politics within its own 
borders and the global economic and AEC regional dynamics based 
on the neoliberal paradigm for globalization.40  The tensions caused 
 
 38.  Supra note 28 at 111; see also OECD Warning African Urbanization May Not Yet Be 
Sustainable (May 24, 2016), http://www.economywatch.com/news/OECD-Warning-
African-Urbanization-May-Not-Yet-Be-Sustainable0524.html (last visited Sept. 11, 
2016). 
 39.  OECD Warning African Urbanization May Not Yet Be Sustainable (May 24, 2016), 
http://www.economywatch.com/news/OECD-Warning-African-Urbanization-May-
Not-Yet-Be-Sustainable0524.html (last visited Sept. 11, 2016). 
 40.  Supra, Note 9, Posner & Young; Golder & Watchekon; See Intergovernmental Or-
ganizations, UNITED NATIONS (2016), http://www.un.org/en/sections/member-
states/intergovernmental-organizations/index.html (elaborating on more information 
about the various African Nation States and their overlapping economic regional part-
nerships). 
AUTHOR NOTE: Regional configurations from within the African Economic Community 
(AEC) are also part and parcel of the struggle for the overall nation-state seeking legit-
imacy from the people they seek to govern. States voluntarily participate in various 
pillars of the AEC but that activity has the propensity to negatively impact the core 
function of the nation-sate. Historically, the primary AEC regional focus appears to be 
based solely on economic capital development and utilization for a common market 
and money union, a consolidated effort which was rapidly developed across one dec-
ade (1980-1990) and deeply imbedded with the global economic organizing principles 
of the neoliberal era (c.1980-2010). See discussion in third section of this article. 
States who were literally “bought into” this neoliberal paradigm had a double-blind 
spot in guarding their duty for participatory democracy and individual liberty protec-
tions—it is well documented that these economic organizing principles did not support 
sustainable state-level public institutional function and routinely dismantled the sus-
tainability of social capital or human capital program funding at the level of the state. 
Suffice it to say here though that when the fragility of public institutions in African 
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by this fragmentation impede the state as it seeks to empower its own 
domestic level governance structures and secure democratic function 
and adequate funding of its public institutions.  This tension was pal-
pable throughout the 2016-2017 election cycles.41 
The charged atmosphere around various African elections and 
political parties actively point to a growing sense of citizen entitle-
ment that in turn demands a proper balance related to state accounta-
bility.  The democratic challenge calls for a new vision of state sov-
ereignty; one that builds a different kind of civil society, effectively 
unifies and empowers multi-level competition and governance, and 
both anchors state-level legitimacy needed to design a new set of 
global market organizing principles that  functions beyond the ne-
oliberal paradigm [c.1980-2010] notion of “trickle-down” global 
economics.42  This particular set of economic organizing principles is 
often controlled by the African political elite, and in this case, from 
within a set of  AEC regional economic configurations on the conti-
nent that function to the detriment of nation-state autonomy and gov-
ernance models.43  This dynamic, coupled with the neoliberal para-
 
states aligned with the structural demands of the neoliberal paradigm for a priority on 
regional AEC development, there was bound to be slippage not only in the nation-sate 
functionality but also in commitments to participatory democracy with effective public 
institutions. The nation-state in the twenty-first century is now challenged to become 
more than just a repository for global and regional economic actors.  
 41.  See Joe Mwansa Lombe Kaluba, Zambia’s 2016 Elections: The Aftermath, ZAMBIA 
REPORTS (Aug. 31, 2016), https://zambiareports.com/2016/08/31/zambias-2016-
elections-the-aftermath. 
 42.  See JOHN GRAY, FALSE DAWN: THE DELUSIONS OF GLOBAL CAPITALISM (1998) 
(providing a detailed step-by-step review and analysis from the state’s perspective out-
lining how a neoliberal set of global economic organizing principles functioned to de-
stroy domestic level public sector budgets by transferring assets wholesale to the pri-
vate sector as a pre-condition for market access, locked out democratic legislative 
oversight through private sector contracts, and more). 
 43.  A partial resource list on the context for globalization of the late 20th century and the 
negative impact the neoliberal paradigm (c.1980-2010) for global capitalism has had 
on exercise of State autonomy: S.A. Ramirez, ‘Taking Economic Rights Seriously Af-
ter the Debt Crisis’[2011] 42 Loy. U. Chi. L. J. 713 ; see also Dani Rodrik, The Glob-
alization Paradox : Democracy and the Future of the World Economy [ W.W. Norton 
& Co., 2011]; see M. Milgate & S.C. Stimson, After Adam Smith: A Century of Trans-
formation in Politics and Political Ideology [ Princeton University Press 2009]; ]; see 
also Paul Krugman, Trade and Wages Reconsidered [Brookings Institute: Papers on 
Economics,2008] ; see P. McMichaels, Development and Social Change: A Global 
Perspective [ Sage  2008]; see P. Nolan, Capitalism and Freedom : The Contradictory 
Character of Globalization [ Anthem Press 2008]; see J. Abu-Lughod,’ Globalization 
in Search of a Paradigm’, in I. Rossi ,ed., Frontiers of Globalization Research: Theo-
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digm and its economic impact for fostering these African regional 
pressures, have limited the legitimacy and scope of individual state 
sovereignty and cannot be ignored.44 
In Africa, the rapid AEC integration between 1980-1990 was 
fostered by the global neoliberal economic organizing principles, and 
by the international private sector seeking to operate within compet-
ing regional configurations at the expense of designing strong, uni-
fied political units of governance at the level of the nation-state.45  
 
retical and Methodological Approaches[ Springer 2007]; see also R. Abdelal, Capital 
Rules: The Construction of Global Finance [ Harvard University Press 2007] ; see  R. 
Findlay& K. H. O’Rourke, Power and Plenty: Trade, War and The World Economy in 
the Second Millenium [ Princeton University Press ,2007]; see B.K. Gills & W.R. 
Thompson, eds., Globalization and Global History [Routledge 2006]; see also John 
Bogle, The Battle for the Soul of Capitalism [ Yale University Press 2005]; see also C. 
El-Ojeile & P Hayden, New  Critical Theories of Globalization [2006]; see also J.A. 
Scholte, Globalization: A Critical Introduction [ Palgrave MacMillan 2006] ; see also 
J. Osterhammel and M. Pertersson, Globalization: A Short History [Dona Geyer, 
trans., Princeton University Press 2005]; R.H.  Robbins, Global Problems and The 
Culture of Capitalism[3rd Edn., Pearsons 2005]; see R. Robertson, The Three Waves of 
Globalization: A History of Developing Global Consciousness[ Zed Books 2003]; see 
B. Smart, Economy, Culture and Society: A Sociological Critique of Neo-Liberalism 
[Open University Press , 2003]; see also J. Stiglitz, Globalization and its Discontents 
[Penguin Press 2002]; see  P.A. Hall & D. W. Soskice ,eds., Varieties of Capitalism: 
The Institutional Foundations of Capitalism[ Oxford University Press 2001]; see M. 
Kohr, Re-Thinking Globalization : Critical Issues and Policy Choices[ Zed Books  
2001]; see M.A. Bamyeh, The Ends of Globalization [University of Minnesota 2000]; 
see A. Bhaduri, ‘ Implications of Globalization for Macroeconomics: Theory and Poli-
cy in Developing Countries’, in D. Baker, G. Epstein & R. Pollins, eds., Globalization 
and Progressive Economic Change [Cambridge University Press 1998] ; see C. Chase-
Dunn, Global Formation: Structure of the World Economy [Cambridge University 
Press 1989]; see  J.M. Keynes, General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money 
[MacMillan 1936] 
 44.  Supra, note 42, Gray. 
 45.  Supra, Note 7, Africa Progress Report /Annan, at 81-87. [Governments once at the 
unified level of the nation-state needs to set the terms of national strategies for re-
source extractions and sustainable economic development including but not limited to 
licensing and regulations. Yet, poor oversight of state-operated corporations is costly; 
e.g., between Nigeria and Angola missing funds of USD $4.2 bil to $6.8 bil assets 
from state-owned operations documented. There are still patterns of underpricing of 
concessions given by states [or intra-state governmental subdivisions, e.g., councils, 
provinces, regions] to private operators that have negatively impacted revenue and 
GDP outcomes.  Special waiver programs such as extensive tax concessions and “tax 
holidays”, low royalty payments and even complete corporate tax exemptions hurt the 
sustainability of the Africa nation-state. An example of the implications of erratic tax 
policies: Zambia had half a million copper mine workers between 2005-2009 that were 
paying higher taxes than major copper multinational mining companies.  Trade mis-
pricing which continued since 2008 has cost Africa USD $38 billion annually meaning 
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States and even municipalities within states began to compete with 
each other at the expense of a single core function of the state, name-
ly to protect and coordinate essential capital resources (economic, so-
cial, and human) within a defined geographic boundary.46 These  pri-
vate sector regional partnerships and global economic configurations 
blurred pre-established state geographic boundaries and politicized 
multi-layers of distrust and financial obligations by fragmenting the 
traditional role of the sovereign state. 
Rodrik argues that the blind spot of the capitalist globalization 
process in the neoliberal era (c.1980-2010) consisted of deep and rap-
id integration in the world economy, coupled with the idea that the 
required institutional underpinnings could catch up later at the do-
mestic level of the state.47 Rodrik’s focus on structure would priori-
tize these matters: African-state domestic level infrastructure, eradi-
cating corruption, empowering multi-level governance, promoting 
justice and equity in economic development, defining clear roles of 
regional economic partnerships, addressing poverty, and health and 
education – all from within a unique history and cultural dynamic of 
the African nation-state, but each with different dynamics and priori-
ties that may impact the core function of the state as a whole.48  The 
continuum of sovereignty discussed here suggests a new typology that 
 
Africa as a Continent could double its OECD aid by simply fixing trade mispricing 
practices. Underfinancing of health care initiatives in Zambia, Kenya and Nigeria 
show that it is done intentionally as a form of ceremonial compliance only. These pro-
grams are skewed away from the most disadvantaged. In Nigeria 1.5% of GDP for the 
Care For the People program covers approximately 22,000 households or less than 
0.001 % of population.] 
 46.  Id. 
 47.  Dani Rodrik, The Globalization Paradox : Democracy and the Future of the World 
Economy [ W.W. Norton & Co., 2011] 231-242,245 [ discussing a dominant role for 
the nation State in relation to the principles of democratic decision-making which is 
the foundation for the international economic architecture; noting that when States are 
not democratic this scaffolding collapses and one cannot presume a country’s institu-
tional arrangements reflect the preference of its citizens]; see generally M. Milgate & 
S.C. Stimson, After Adam Smith: A Century of Transformation in Politics and Political 
Ideology [ Princeton University Press 2009]; see also  Robert Riech, Saving Capital-
ism [Vintage Press,2015] [discussing new domestic and global market mechanisms 
beyond neoliberal constructs and outlines five new building blocks for capitalism; 
suggesting that the terms “free market”, “free trade” and “freedom of contract” are 
clearly defined legal constructs that can be “redefined” in this century to be more in-
clusive, that in their current forms may not always be a vehicle for the protection of 
participatory democracy and individual liberty] 
 48.  Id., Rodrik. 
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has the flexibility and sustainability to meet these ongoing state-level 
challenges. 
With respect to how African nation-states might develop and uti-
lize economic capital and its potential as part of the proposed contin-
uum of state sovereignty, Rodrik’s premise points to a basic principle 
that markets always require other social institutions (at the domestic 
level) to support legal arrangements and global market stabilizing 
functions so there can be a sustainable state-level coordination of fair 
redistribution, taxation, safety nets, and social insurance.49  As Afri-
can states seek to more even-handedly adjust its legal arrangements 
and market functions at the core of the nation-state, in the post-
election 2018-2010 period, careful review of several basic structural 
principles might prove to be crucial. 
First, the singular focus of the past neoliberal era [c.1980-2010] 
that relied on global market development to support concentrated 
economic growth in various regions of Africa and /or to serve private 
sector foreign direct investment at various  competing sub-levels in-
side the state [e.g., municipalities, regions, provinces, and councils] 
should raise caution in Africa.50  There is widespread documentation 
of the uneven implementation and results of the neoliberal paradigm 
[c.1980-2010] within the capitalist globalization process.51  This issue 
of general dissatisfaction evidenced by citizen protests during the 
2016-2017 African election cycles reflect failed notions of both 
“trickle down” economic benefits  [a neoliberal construct] that have 
not occurred for the average citizen’s standard of living and of in-
 
 49.  Id., Rodrick at 237-239 [ setting out a series of statements in support of a state’s right 
to protect their owns social arrangements, regulations and institutions; and suggesting 
that trade is a means to an end, not an end in itself so that globalization should be an 
instrument for achieving the goals that a society seeks: prosperity, stability, freedom 
and quality of life] 
 50.  Id. 
 51.  Supra, Note 43. Author Note: The legitimacy of the neoliberal paradigm [c.1980-
2010] for the globalization process has increasingly been challenged as the impact of 
the 2008-2010 global recession continued and as global financial institutions are still 
forced to wrestle with the regulatory boundaries of a global market, the grow-
ing/ongoing financial and  political instability of State governments[ Greece, Italy, 
Spain, Egypt, Ireland, Portugal to name a few] , equity issues in the global political 
economy, and the growing demands to create a more humane paradigm for capitalist 
globalization. Contact author for a full listing of references on the neoliberal paradigm 
[c.1980-2010] for global capitalism and this impact of its economic organizing princi-
ples on nation-state. 
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cremental budgetary policy for social and human capital development 
that have not predictably supported growing human need.52  The fail-
ures of “trickle down” economics is not merely an intra-state munici-
pal/region/province/council level issue to be addressed separately at 
each independent sub-level of governance. These failed economic or-
ganizing principles negatively impact the African state as a whole in 
its legitimate governing capacity. 
It is a nation-state function to create and provide unifying eco-
nomic organizing principles where advantages for the nation-state as 
a whole can be addressed in a more cohesive and integrated manner.53 
The historical process of applying the neoliberal paradigm across Af-
rica perhaps has intentionally remained non-integrated, regionally fo-
cused and overtly competitive against and between municipali-
ties/regions/councils as a way to give outside international and 
private sector  economic interests a competitive edge over the nation-
state in terms of its primary role – namely protecting participatory 
democracy and individual liberty.54 If the state is kept busy continu-
ously settling municipal contract disputes over resource/commodity 
development and utilization or jockeying for competitive advantage 
with other states in the same regional geographically configured area, 
then there can be little focus on developing a core function of the na-
tion-state within a framework of liberty. 
Second, Rodrik concludes a state has the right to protect its own 
public institutions, social arrangements, and regulations so that glob-
alization becomes an instrument for achieving the goals that a society 
seeks: prosperity, stability, freedom and quality of life. 55  It has been 
the uneven application of the neoliberal paradigm [c. 1980-2010], 
both from a global perspective and from within regional AEC config-
urations, that has tragically limited state sovereignty in a variety of 
 
 52.  Supra, Note 47, Rodrik at 181.  
 53.  Supra, Note 7, AFRICAN PROGRESS REPORT/ANNAN 
 54.  Id.  
 55.  Supra,  Note 47, Rodrik, at 231-242,245 [setting out a series of statements in support 
of a State’s right to protect their own  social arrangements ,regulations and institutions; 
and suggesting that trade is a means to an end , not an end in itself so that globalization 
should be an instrument for achieving the goals that a society seeks: prosperity, stabil-
ity, freedom and quality of life; noting that when states are not democratic this scaf-
folding collapses and one cannot presume a country’s institutional arrangements re-
flect the preference of its citizens; concluding that non-democratic states must play by 
a different, less permissive set of rules in the global marketplace]. 
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African contexts—sovereign legitimacy that now will require a re-
balancing process in terms of aligning global and regional trade as a 
means to an end, and not an end in itself .56 
Often the functional role and legitimacy of state sovereignty lies 
dormant until a conflict, like a change in political parties, emerges or 
competitive political campaigns surface and challenge the status quo. 
Then the issues of sovereign powers as well as state legitimacy or  
authority arise, are challenged, and need to be redefined.  These de-
mands are now made not upon a set of elected individuals or candi-
dates for public office, but upon the overall state’s functional role and 
scope of legitimate authority acting as a sovereign nation-state.57 
This re-balancing process points directly to a much-needed de-
bate in the 2018-2020 post-election period.  The sustainability of the 
African state—specific domestic social arrangements and the State’s 
utilization of globalization as a blunt tool to achieve prosperity, sta-
bility, freedom and quality of life.  A structured but more transparent 
internal functional review at the level of the nation-state could facili-
tate a new definition and deeper engagement in the role for twenty-
first century state sovereignty – a continuum for sovereignty operat-
ing within a framework of liberty. 
Third, the proposed GeoNOMOS© continuum of sovereignty de-
signs a single core function for the state both in relationship: [a] to all 
citizens within the geographic boundary of the state [vertical axis] 
from whom the State as a legal entity now seeks legitimacy in order 
to govern, and, [b] to the state’s coordinated engagement in the re-
gional / global marketplace [horizontal axis] from an intentionally 
crafted long term strategic and sustainability perspective that folds in 
multi-levels of governance [e.g., municipalities, councils, regions, 
 
 56.  Supra, Note 42, providing a detailed step-by-step review and analysis from the state’s 
perspective outlining how a neoliberal set of global economic organizing principles 
functioned to destroy domestic level public sector budgets by transferring assets 
wholesale to the private sector as a pre-condition for market access, locked out demo-
cratic legislative oversight through private sector contracts, and more] 
 57.  Karen A. O’Rourke, The Crossroads of Globalization, Human Rights, and Rule of 
Law: Creating a Legal Culture of Human Rights Designing a Geonomos Model for the 
State. AM. U., 301 (2012). ( The GeoNOMOS Model© is copyrighted and consists of a 
series of schematics addressing the function of the nation state in the 21st century, of 
which diagram 6 is incorporated into this article for purposes of discussion only) 
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provinces] but does not complete with municipalities, councils, re-
gions and provinces within each respective nation-state. 58 
Applying the continuum of sovereignty to these four African na-
tions would see these states better positioned to develop an enterprise 
of law that in turn generates a new set of economic organizing princi-
ples designed to ensure that economics follows state law and not the 
other way around.59  A transition is needed for the sustainability of 
the state’s own  public institutions, multi-layer governance structures, 
social arrangements, and state regulations.  In other words, if Kenya, 
Nigeria, South Africa and Zambia seek to support a sustainable state 
restructuring in its governance to better secure participatory democ-
racy and individual liberty, then, the activity of the state needs to 
begin by redefining the core function of the state. 
Why A New Typology for State Sovereignty in Africa: 
Endorsements Beyond Westphalia 
The world in relation to the operation of sovereign states has 
changed dramatically in the last half of the twentieth century demon-
strated by the end of traditional colonialism and the sheer number of 
newly emerging African nation-states claiming and being accorded 
sovereignty.60  Traditional notions of sovereignty established by the 
Treaty of Westphalia [1648] are no longer fully applicable or realistic 
as the state legitimizes its function in the twenty-first century.61  Fur-
thermore, as global economic organizing principles have also 
changed over time, the ongoing function of state sovereignty was al-
tered even into the early twenty-first century.62  But even in what is 
 
 58.  Id.  
 59.  Supra, Note 14, Forms of Capital, for references and very brief definitions of three 
forms of capital noted in this new typology; this commentary suggests that every state 
has these three forms of capital and the differences in how states define their function 
is directly related to the amount of each form of capital that the state constructively 
balances, manages and oversees as a sovereignty entity. Contact author for full list of 
resources on these essential forms of capital. 
 60.  Supra, Note 9, Posner and Young; Goldner and Watchekton  
 61.  The Treaty of Westphalia [1648] originally was signed to stop the religious wars of 
the 17th century by securing a domestic jurisdiction and a defined geographic boundary 
for emerging nations, thus offering protection for nation States; See 
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/17th_century/westphal.asp [last visited August 22,2016] ;  
 62.  Barry Buzan and George Lawson, The global transformation: the nineteenth century 
and the making of modern international relations, INT’L STUD. Q. 59 (2012), 
http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/44894/1/__libfile_REPOSITORY_Content_Lawson%2C%20G
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viewed as a traditional approach to the recognition of a new sover-
eign state, the underlying issue for each African nation-state may be 
this: the traditional scope of the state sovereignty required for sustain-
ing state-level governance may never have been fully recognized or 
secured as each African state initially emerged out of a colonial mod-
el of governance and continued or even expanded very broad intra-
state governance structures mostly based on ethnic or historical geo-
graphic locations of people.63 
Historically, the idea, even in post-colonial times, that how sov-
ereign states conduct themselves is a dynamic phenomenon in con-
stant flux requires a parallel consideration that there will be another 
set of transitions required in this century as the defined role, legitima-
cy, responsibility and operational function of a sovereign state con-
tinues to change.  The changing global realities of the last fifty years 
and certainly the challenges to state legitimacy presented in the 2016-
2017 election cycles on the African continent point to the evolution 
of a continuum of state sovereignty for this century, one that better 
coordinates intra-state cooperation, addresses the legitimacy of its cit-
izen concerns, and designs a new global, better coordinated regional 
market paradigm. 
Debates concerning state sovereignty that ensued at the end of 
the twentieth century and into the early twenty-first century bear rel-
evance to the post-election context in Africa. New typologies for 
state sovereignty reflect an evolution in the expression of state sover-
eignty emerging with more inclusive ideas that relied on state collab-
oration and interdependence including a more interactive and rela-
tional definition of how states expresses their sovereignty. 64  Jack 
 
_The%20global%20transformation%20the%20nineteenth%20century%20and%20the
%20making%20of%20modern%20international%20relations_The%20global%20trans
for-
mation%20the%20nineteenth%20century%20and%20the%20making%20of%20moder
n%20international%20relations%20%28LSERO%29.pdf 
 63.  Id. 
 64.   See G. Palombella & N. Walker, eds., Relocating the Rule of Law [ Hart 2009]; see 
Barak Y. Orbach, The New Regulatory Era: An Introduction [2009] 51 Ariz. L. Rev 
575 ; see  Eric Engles, ‘Transformation of the International Legal Order’[2007]23 
Quinnipiac  L.Rev.23; see also James Rosenau, ‘Three Steps Toward a Viable Theory 
for Globalization’, in I Rossi, ed.,  Frontiers of Globalization Research: Theoretical 
and Methodological Approaches[ Springer 2007]; see  E. Krahmann, ‘ National Re-
gional and Global Governance: One Phenomenon or Many’[2003] 9 Global Govern-
ance 323; see also B. Roth, ‘ The  Enduring Significance of State Sovereignty’[2004] 
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Donnelly proposed a new typology [ a four-sectioned rectangular 
box] that balanced state authority and capabilities with sovereign rule 
and the state’s scope of domination as it intersected effective compo-
nents of formal sovereignty and material/normative weaknesses.65 
Francis Deng and Helen Stacey suggested two different typology 
arrangements for sovereignty as responsibility and relational sover-
eignty.66  Deng’s typology analyzed a range of both internal and ex-
ternal state factors and then, correlated these factors with a new inter-
national standard of responsible sovereignty as an irreversible 
process.67  Helen Stacey suggested that a new typology of relational 
sovereignty was emerging where the sovereign would be judged by 
how well and by what means the state concretely and continuously 
“cares” for its people. 68 
A fourth typology by Julian Ku and John Yoo discussed a popu-
lar sovereignty based on the idea that people in a sovereign state gov-
ern themselves through constitutional structures and institutions.69  In 
 
56 Fla.L.Rev.1017; see  Paul Kahn, ‘The Question of Sovereignty’[2004] 40 Stan J. 
Int’l L. 259,260-268; see Paul Kahn, Putting Liberalisim in its Place[Princeton Uni-
versity Press 2005]; see A. Clair Cutler, ‘Critical Reflections on the Westphalian As-
sumptions of International Law and Organization: A Crisis of Legitimacy’[2001] 27 
Rev. Int’l Law Stud 133; see Michael Fowler & J. M. Bunck, Law, Power and The 
Sovereign [ Routledge 1995]; for historical notions of sovereignty , see Thomas  
Hobbes, Leviathan: Parts One and Two, Herbert Schnieder, ed.[18th Edn, Bobbs Mer-
rill Co, 1958]; see also Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan ,C. B. MacPherson ,ed. [ 1st Edn, 
Penguin Books 1968]; see also John Locke, Second Treatise of Government , Thomas 
Peardon, ed.[ 1st Edn, Prentice-Hall,1953] 
Resource lists on State Sovereignty that supports the analysis is available for authors.   
 65.  Richard Falk, “Jack Donnelly: State Sovereignty and Human Rights”, Political Sci-
ence Quarterly [1981] 
 66.  Francis Deng, Frontiers of Sovereignty, 8 Leiden J. Int’l L. 249, [1995]; See also Hel-
en Stacey, Relational Sovereignty, 55 Stanford L.Rev.210 [2009].  
 67.  Id., Deng at 250-277.   
 68.  Supra, Note 66., Stacey, at 218-222. 
 69. Julian Ku and John Yoo, Globalization and Sovereignty, 31 Berkeley J. Int’l L 210 
[2013];[noting that  sovereignty is in decline but the decline in national sovereignty  is 
not desirable since state  maintains decision-making and individual liberties. Suggest-
ing a new form of popular sovereignty with shift away from Westphalian models to the 
right for people to govern themselves through institutions of the Constitution and its 
structures. Popular sovereignty is flexible to maintain national sovereignty and as-
sumes state can share sovereign power without giving up entire system; popular sover-
eignty can co-exist with globalization and governance issues in ways that the rigidity 
of Westphalian system could not. State turning automatically to international organiza-
tions inconsistent with reliance and continued power of nation States; by referring to 
structural provisions of Constitution. eg, separation of powers, promotes state level 
democratic governance and incorporates the gains of international cooperation] 
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this construct, the state can legitimately share sovereign power with 
its citizens without compromising the whole system.70  The typology 
presented in this article builds on concepts noted above pointing to 
yet another evolution in how sovereign states function in this centu-
ry.71  The GeoNOMOS© that establishes a continuum for sovereign-
ty, is anchored within a framework of liberty and secures the single 
core function of the nation -state.72 
The GeoNOMOS© operates interactively on two levels of a state 
and offers both sovereign stability and operational flexibility by ad-
dressing the two primary functional components of any twenty-first 
century state.  One component redefines how  the sovereign state 
functions to create  and sustain a civil society within its own domestic 
sphere [vertical axis] and addresses the specific needs of its popula-
tions who will live and work most of their lives within the geographic  
boundary of that state, and a second component seeks to redefine how 
the sovereign state functions and engages within its own regional / 
international sphere [horizontal axis] by engaging with the public 
and private sector global marketplace and foreign investment sector, 
public sector international institutions, other African states in the re-
gional AEC pillars, and an international community of states. 73 The 
state is located at the crossroad / intersection of these two axis points 
in the continuum for state sovereignty because the state simultaneous-
ly must coordinate both a domestic function [vertical] and a region-
al/international function [horizontal] as described. 
As each nation-state begins to build a different engagement for 
domestically integrated political function at the level of the state, 
based on collaboration rather than fierce competition or corruption 
among and between the various intra-state multi-level ethnocentric 
 
 70.  Id. at 218.   
 71.  Id. 
 72.  Supra, Note 11, defining continuum and why the continuum of sovereignty is pro-
posed. 
 73.  Without a doubt, the rapid and uncontrolled movement of private sector global capital 
and public sector capital and domestic finances in and out a State’s legal boundaries 
also bears witness to these relational components of state sovereignty within the inter-
national sphere of the equation. The same flexibility of global movement never 
seemed to occur on the side of development or utilization of social and human capital. 
While economic capital was and remains highly mobile and unregulated, most human 
labor [human capital] is bound by state geographic boundaries and people’s life cir-
cumstances and citizenship rights are dictated by those state boundaries.   
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structures. This appears to be a significant challenge for stability at 
the core function of the four nation-states reviewed for this article.  
Some of these matters may be governed by state constitutional provi-
sions that have yet to be fully articulated, analyzed and enforced.  
Others reflect longstanding political practices and jockeying of politi-
cal personalities and campaign promises made. However, in a 2018-
2020 post-election action plan, the overriding issue remains the sta-
bility and consistency of the single core function of the state in rela-
tion to balancing development and utilization of essential capital re-
sources [economic capital, social capital, and human capital] to the 
benefit of all citizens in the state. 
The state rests at the intersection of the vertical axis [domestic 
function] and the horizontal axis [ regional/ international function].  
At the intersection of these two axis, the three essential capital re-
sources of the state also intersect in the form of three overlapping, 
equally sized circles depicting the core function of the state to con-
sistently engage, balance and protect is three essential resources – 
economic capital, social capital and human capital.74 
A Continuum of Sovereignty Based on Liberty 
The GeoNOMOS© [continuum of sovereignty] represents a 
graphic schematic depicting the next evolution for state sovereignty 
because it differentiates three important principles.75  One, it posits 
conceptually that for all human activity, enterprise and undertakings 
at the level of the state, liberty represents the outer geographic 
boundary of any and all such endeavors.76  Beyond this framework of 
liberty nothing can, nor does exist, and all activity with the state falls 
within the four corners of this frame defined by liberty at the state’s 
outer boundary. 
Two, the GeoNOMOS© distinguishes, in contrast to other mod-
els which seek to develop an economic/legal model, or some other 
models for nation-states from times long past, that the nation-state 
and the nation-state alone can function as a legal guarantor as it alone 
 
 74.  Supra, Note 57. 
 75.  Id.  
 76.  To be distinguished as “freedom from” factors like oppression, slavery, prejudice and 
racism, and to be distinguished from “Liberty” as the quintessential element which en-
ables whereas freedom does not in and of itself enable. 
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can vouchsafe liberty both toward the individual and also toward oth-
er nation-states and supranational organizations who operate with 
semi-governmental character.  The nation-state alone is the only enti-
ty that can hold supranational organizations accountable to some 
form of law. It is the nation-state alone that can balance individual 
human rights with global commerce and the overreach of global in-
ternational and inter-governmental networks.77  It is the nation-state 
alone that can exercise jurisdiction legitimately. 
Three, the GeoNOMOS© [continuum of sovereignty] remains 
dynamic and ever evolving through the intense and continued interac-
tion of three forms of capital [e.g, social capital, human capital and 
economic capital] as the purpose and single core function of the na-
tion-state.  It is the state consistently functioning at the center of these 
three forms of capital that will secure a balance between these three 
essential resources to the benefit of the individual [those persons the 
state seeks to govern] as it stabilizes is domestic function [vertical ax-
is] and its regional/ international function [horizontal axis].78 All of 
this activity occurs and is grounded within the framework of liberty. 
Liberty is that quintessential element necessary in human exist-
ence which is the fertile ground to allow the most productive, creative 
and mutually beneficial human endeavors and interactions to flourish 
and to bring benefits to all, and the absence of which tends to dampen 
the manifold expressions of all those truths people collectively hold 
to be self-evident.79  It is grounded in the rule of law, to be distin-
guished from freedom, and requires a steadfast juxtaposition and 
weighing of individual and communal rights, benefits, obligations 
and privileges without which no human civil society can function.  In 
the continuum of sovereignty [GeoNOMOS], the existence of liberty 
 
 77.  Jean L Cohen, GLOBALIZATION AND SOVEREIGNTY: RETHINKING LEGALITY, 
LEGITIMACY, AND CONSTITUTIONALISM 72 (CAMBRIDGE UNIV. PRESS, 2012). 
 78.  In this construct, a failed nation-state can be described as a nation-station where the 
boundaries of the three forms of capital have become disconnected, i.e., the nation-
state has been forced into one or the other circle, but cannot be in all three circles. 
More importantly, such a state has become unable stay at the core of these capital re-
sources to keep and preserve the necessary areas of overlap between these three forms 
of capital.   
 79.  Supra, Note 77, at 72. 
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further forms a foundation to all of human community and its guaran-
tor can only be the nation-state.80 
There is no doubt that liberty in this framework will be a highly 
contested topic and hotly debated not unlike rule of law, and it should 
be so both nationally, regionally and transnationally across the Afri-
can continent.81  T.H. Green defines liberty as the capacity to do 
 
 80.  T.H. Green, ‘Liberal Legislation and Freedom of Contract’, in D. Miller, ed., The Lib-
erty Reader [ Paradigm Press 2006] [arguing that liberty is a means to an end and free-
dom forms a goal for social efforts; concluding that the institution of property can be 
justified only as a means to free exercise altogether and that no contract is valid in 
which human beings willingly or unwillingly are dealt with as commodities]. 
 81.  Samantha Besson & J. L. Marti,’Law and Republicanism: Mapping the Issues’, in S. 
Besson & J L. Marti eds.,  Legal Republicanism: National and International Perspec-
tives [ Oxford University Press 2009][noting that works contributing to the long tradi-
tion of republican philosophy include the works of Aristotle, Montesquieu, Rousseau, 
Arendt, Cicero, Machiavelli, Harrington, Paine and Jefferson ; suggesting that republi-
canism and liberalism are not foes but allies; the differences in these two theories is a 
matter of  approach and interpretation as republicanism is more forward-looking as it 
seeks to identify the conditions for protecting liberty; legal republicanism is a norma-
tive theory that is concerned about the content and structure or the form of law as it re-
lates to those substantive and procedural standards designed to protect liberty; republi-
canism can be found in all areas that traditionally constitute the law and nothing 
prevents the development of new principles of republican contract law, republican la-
bor law, republican administrative law, and so on;]; see generally, J. MacCormick, In-
stitutions of Law: An Essay in Legal Theory [ Oxford University Press 2007][see in 
section Law, Morality and Methodology] ; see Phillip Petit, ‘The Republican Ideal of 
Freedom’ in, D. Miller, ed., The Liberty Reader [Paradigm Press  2006][ suggesting 
that equal distribution of the ideal of liberty as noninterference would leave a lot to be 
desired in regard to redistribution and fall short of distributive justice; concluding that 
liberty as non-domination will require a more substantial commitment to redistribu-
tion; and if redistribution measures adopted can be pursued under a fair rule of law, 
then these measures do not themselves introduce any form of domination; this is so 
because redistribution under a republican theory is a form of conditioning liberty on 
par with the conditioning affected by factors like poverty or disability or illness; redis-
tribution puts  the State under intense scrutiny to prevent relatively arbitrary powers 
and to secure constitutional constraints]; see J. Bohman, ‘Cosmopolitan Republican-
ism and The Rule of Law’, in S. Besson & J. L. Marti ,eds., Legal Republicanism : Na-
tional and International Perspectives [ Oxford University Press 2009] [ arguing that 
non-domination is a power that belongs to individuals who can control their own des-
tiny and this negatively requires the power of any agent who can prevent ills from 
happening to them; furthermore, citizens can define and redefine their  polity with 
each other]; see  Isaiah Berlin, ‘Two Concepts of Liberty’ in Henry Hardy, ed.,  Liber-
ty: Incorporating Four Essays on Liberty [Oxford University Press 2002] [Berlin 
speaks of positive liberty as self-mastery and negative liberty as the absence of ob-
struction or interference]; see D. Miller, ed., The Liberty Reader[ Paradigm Press 
2006][speaking of  three different doctrines that come to represent positive liberty: the 
capacity to act in certain ways as contrasted with mere absence of interference; the 
freedom of rational self-direction where one’s life is governed by rational desires; and 
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things, not the mere absence of restraint and, thus, liberty actively in-
cludes a moral value and certain social elements that are enjoyed in 
common with others.82  While there is no agreement even among the 
many schools of republican legal thought, liberty is defined primarily 
as non-domination by the state and its governing sub-parts, and in-
cludes human rights, civic virtue and the creation of a common 
good.83  These basic characteristics of a liberal republican theory are 
incorporated within the GeoNOMOS© continuum of sovereignty as 
part of participatory democracy, supported by an interventionist state 
whose single core function continuously reflects and balances the de-
velopment and utilization of all its essential capital resources. 84 This 
active participatory function at the core of the state includes a rule of 
law that reflects the principles of mutual benefit, liberty and human 
dignity. 
The proposed continuum of sovereignty is highly interactional 
process based in part on the law of merchants constructed for a socie-
ty of economic traders, and espouses that the ‘rule of law’ will have 
meaning only from within the social context reflected by the interac-
tion of public institutions, regulations, procedures, and values depict-
ed at the core of the GeoNOMOS© where the single core function of 
the state is secured.85  The framework of liberty is intentionally creat-
ed as part of the continuum of sovereignty since there can be no 
claims for state legitimacy and, thus, no state-related activity con-
ducted outside the framework of liberty. 
The functioning and manifestations of liberty are secured by its 
four cornerstones and by the constant and continual interaction and 
balancing inside the framework of liberty for the state’s three forms 
of capital: economic, social, and human capital.  These forms of capi-
tal are found to exist in every form of human society, or human asso-
 
collective self-determination where each person plays a role in controlling the social 
environment through democratic institutions]. 
 82.  Supra, Note 80. 
 83.  Supra, Note 57. 
 84.  Id. 
 85.  The single core function of the state is to consistently and intentionally balance its 
three essential forms of capital: economic capital, social capital and human capital. In 
doing so, the state governs the development and utilization of its capital resources in 
ways designed to protect both its viability and sustainability as a political entity be-
cause as it meets the human rights needs of people, it is attempting to govern and bal-
ances its activity in the global marketplace. 
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ciation, albeit to differing degrees and at different levels of develop-
ment, but can be discerned and even measured quantitatively to be 
present and functioning in a state of association and in a state of flux.  
From within this framework of liberty and moving along this contin-
uum of state sovereignty, each state secures its single core function 
[sovereign capacity] to manage a wide range of possibilities because 
all domestic and international actors must also function within the 
state’s framework of liberty. 
The framework of liberty is anchored by four cornerstones–two 
on the lower end of the frame depicting equity and justice[ethics] that 
support the principle of mutual benefit, and two on the upper corners 
of the framework of liberty depicting elements that support the prin-
ciple of human dignity—individual autonomy/choice and individual 
capability/resource development.86 This framework depicts an actual 
relationship that can be measured along the continuum between the 
state and the people it seeks to govern so long as the state continues 
to function within the framework of liberty.87  This dynamic exists 
because quantitative outcomes for the qualitative work that the state 
undertakes at its single core function designs a more legitimate ac-
countability and transparent expression of state sovereignty in rela-
tion to how the state uses its three essential capital resources in the 
domestic sphere [vertical axis] and in the  regional /international 
sphere [horizontal axis] of its day-to-day function.88 
The four African nations discussed in this article already have 
possession of all these capital resources and within their existing con-
stitutions, each has the authority and relative stability to engage with 
the integrated vision of the GeoNOMOS©.89 The operational compo-
nents of a continuum of sovereignty align with the driving force of a 
variety of constitutional mandates unique to each of these four 
states.90 The dynamic of this process begins at the state level with a 
thorough review of all of its capital resources and the various stages 
of resource development and utilization.  It secures an integrated sin-
gle core function for the state by functioning within the framework of 
liberty based on its principles of: liberty, mutual benefit, and human 
 
 86.  Supra, Note 57. 
 87.  Id. 
 88.  Id. 
 89.  Id. 
 90.  Id. 
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dignity, to form a new typology called a continuum of state sover-
eignty which the GeoNOMOS© represents. 91  Functioning from 
within a framework of liberty, the state is in a position to design and 
implement a strategy for the post-neoliberalism era that supports its 
domestic stability [vertical function] and its regional AEC/ interna-
tional market economic participation [horizontal function].  The na-
tion-state’s single core function engages at the center of three over-
lapping circles [three forms of capital] and the center of the 
intersection of a vertical axis and a horizontal axis inside the GeoN-
OMOS©.92  This single core function incorporates three essential 
building blocks that belong to every nation-state all of which must 
remain inter-connected and continuously balanced in order for the 
state to maintain legitimacy as sovereign as to its function.93 
A very brief explanation follows on these three essential building 
blocks that form the state single core function follows. 94  Economic 
capital can be defined as the amount of risk capital assessed on a real-
istic basis which a nation-state requires in order to remain solvent 
over a period of time.  Economic capital can be calculated.95  It is an 
open question whether rigorous risk analysis is or can be a necessary 
and required function of government. Yet, it can be reasonably pre-
sumed that it is part and parcel of any and all economic and commer-
cial enterprise.  Social capital is understood as a stock of resources 
that an individual can control by how they invest their time in com-
munity organizations, educational institutions, religious organizations 
 
 91.  Supra, Note 47, Rodrik. 
 92.   Supra, Note 11, Definition of Continuum.  
 93.  Pierre Bourdieu, FORMS OF CAPITAL 47, W.W. Norton (1986).  
 94.  Supra, Note 14, Forms of Capital [ for definition and related explanations]; The other 
two types of capital [social capital and human capital] can be derived from economic 
capital but only at a cost based on the calculated effort of transformation initiated by 
the state at the state level. Individual economic capital is developed and utilized by the 
state in its role as a legal entity. The overlapping circles depicted as the core function 
of the state show that economic capital must remain in a direct and balanced relation-
ship with the other two forms of capital [social and human capital]. By necessity, this 
process of balancing economic capital will point to the state’s relationship with non-
state actors in the global marketplace and in the domestic policy arena. 
 95.  Glyn Holton, Economic Capital, GLYNHOLTON.COM, 
https://www.glynholton.com/notes/economic_capital/.  
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and neighborhood networks.96  It represents a form of trust and reci-
procity that is developed within social networks in any given culture. 
For Africa, the core function of the state will need to embrace a 
way to build strong public institutions that unite longstanding ethnic 
and tribal groups [municipalities, regions, provinces and councils] in 
ways that capital resources are developed, shared, and utilized in 
support of the whole nation-state and not simply along historical eth-
nic groups, political patronage, and tribal geographic configurations.  
Social capital, which as an individual characteristic, tends to aggre-
gate and represents a collective or public good as part of a civil socie-
ty.97  Economic capital and human capital are also forms of capital 
 
 96. Rebecca Bratspies, Regulatory Trust[2009] 51 Ariz.L.Rev.575 [suggesting that as new 
technologies underscore the divergence between market incentives and social welfare, 
social trust can be developed as a resource through creating regulatory agencies that 
function effectively in times of uncertainty][this author noting that Bratspies’s “social 
trust” equates to a form of social capital]; see Richard Sandbrook, Patrick Heller, Marc 
Edelman, & D. Teichman, Social Democracy in the Global Periphery: Origins, Chal-
lenges and Perspectives [State University of New York 2007] [Defining a social de-
mocracy regime as a widely supported set of norms, institutions, and rules constraining 
government to [a]be subjected to democratic control ,and [b] activity to regulate mar-
ket forces and intervene to enhance equity, social protection and social cohesion]; see 
also Janos Berok & Elodie Beth, OECD Overview for Managing Conflicts of Interest 
in the Public Service, 64-70[ OECD 2005][ describing various self-interests that gov-
ernments perceive as creating a conflict of interest sufficient to undermine a public of-
ficial’s ability to faithfully carry out the public’s interest] ;see also Eric M. Uslaner, 
The Moral Foundations of Trust [ Cambridge University Press 2002]; see Joel Sobel, 
Can We Trust Social Capital[2002] 15 Journal of Economic Literature 139,139-145; 
see  Pierre Bourdieu , Forms of Capital [W.W. Norton, 1986 ] [ Bourdieu would say 
that social capital is an attribute of an individual in a social context; one can acquire 
social capital through purposeful actions and can transform social capital in conven-
tional economic gains; the ability to do this conversion depends on the nature of the 
social obligation connections and the networks that are available to one as an individu-
al]. 
 97.  There are examples of intentional social capital development may be helpful for re-
view here. One is the amazing success in South Africa’s eThekwini Municipality 
which established the Municipal Institute of Learning to build capacity for local gov-
ernment and in that process trained 3600 local practitioners in matters related to strate-
gic planning as well as revenue management coupled with new trends for water con-
servation and sanitation.  Can the “best practices” of this municipal level program be 
implemented across a variety of municipal structures as a state building activity to the 
benefit of constructing a different context from within which the nation-state better 
functions ? Second is The Association of African Planning Schools which is a network 
of 54 city and regional planning institutes designed to train urban planners on matters 
of governance, infrastructure planning and law reform. Other examples of success in 
capital development and utilization at the nation state level are evident.  Boosting agri-
cultural and fishing communities across the Continent which support two-thirds of Af-
 
 ILS Journal of International Law  Vol. V. No. II 
265 
but they are generally more fungible in the sense that these two forms 
of capital are linked to private goods.98  Human capital is a hybrid 
consisting of both quantitative and qualitative aspects. Human capital 
in this schematic focuses first and foremost on the individual, and 
then on how that individual reaches maximum levels of capabili-
ties/resource development and individual autonomy in order to con-
tribute to society in ways that the individual actually can choose to 
develop his or her human capital. This is precisely why the two cor-
nerstones for the framework of libertyare linked to the principle of 
human dignity. 
What might take place in the core function of the state when the 
three forms of capital become disjointed and lose connection, instead 
of remaining interconnected as the continuum for sovereignty sug-
gests that they must remain?  In short, in this continuum of sovereign-
ty, the result is a failed nation-state. If a state disconnects the eco-
nomic capital function from the core function of balancing the 
development and utilization of human capital or social capital, the 
state essentially implodes: the state fails as it continues to operate 
outside the framework of liberty.99 Likewise, if a state concentrates 
 
ricans, mostly women is a core function of the nation-state, for state-level coordina-
tion, not exclusively for individual regions, provinces, councils or municipalities situ-
ated on or near these valuable natural resources. Sustained support at the state-level in 
support of justice and equity will require state government sponsored, legally regulat-
ed, and protected infrastructure coupled with accessible and fair financial systems, not 
ethnic patronage, political despots, or conflicting and inconsistent regulatory schemes 
at various municipal/region/council/province levels with in nation State. Some existing 
state-level programs generate social protection programs that can boost income from 
agriculture. Strong growth in agriculture continues in Zambia.  Kenya has developed 
IT applications to support communication between farmers of best practices for plant-
ing, harvesting, dairy production and more [I-COW and M-FARM] and fisheries for 
marketing services [EF-MISKE]. Nigeria and Kenya both offer farmers seed/fertilizer 
subsidies vouchers via mobile applications[E-Wallet]. So the state-level managed out-
comes of tying social capital with economic capital are measurable within the single 
core function of the state even if such function crosses ethnic lines or geographic man-
dates of municipality, province, council, or region. See Supra, Note 7, African Pro-
gress Report/Annan at 43-47;51-57. 
 98.  Supra, Note 93. 
 99.  In like manner, a state whose leadership blatantly opts to exploit one form of capital 
resources over another, will cause serious imbalance at the core function of the state, a 
support a diminished sense of liberty overall, and potentially trigger an internal implo-
sion of domestic level institutions at the expenses of its global marketplace participa-
tion. The imbalance of always prioritizing economic capital development and utiliza-
tion means that public funds and state priorities are not balanced in a focus that 
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only on human capital development without a consistent program for 
economic and social capital development and utilization, it is out of 
balance at its core and will likely fail. The key parameter is consist-
ently balancing the three forms of capital as the core function of the 
state within the framework of liberty because the four corners of the 
liberty framework as described below anchor the State in perpetuity. 
The state’s core integration and balance in the GeoNOMOS© is 
required so state-level public sector institutional development and the 
rule of law reflects strong economic capital but also simultaneously 
addresses aspects of social capital and human capital such as trust, 
mutual benefit and reciprocity.  It is this consistent integration within 
the core function of the state that creates the continuum for state sov-
ereignty. This integration at the single core function of the state oper-
ates in tandem with liberty’s mandates in support of justice and equi-
ty.  The four cornerstones for the framework of liberty reflect a 
standard of conduct that together support the principles of human 
dignity and mutual benefit as the state’s is reflective of individual 
choice, individual capability/resource development, justice, and equi-
ty.100 In this GeoNOMOS © continuum of sovereignty, all actors, 
whether domestic or international, private or public, governmental or 
non-governmental must function from within the framework of liber-
ty because it is axiomatic that nothing can exist outside the frame-
work of liberty. 
Conclusion 
A detailed African action plan in the 2018-2020 post-election pe-
riod could solidify a tremendous domestic and global opportunity on 
the continent —a revitalized process for democracy where the Afri-
can state intentionally designs a deeper engagement concerning the 
legitimacy and the expression of its own state sovereignty. As the 
state and all of its constituent groups learn to engage and respectfully 
function in partnerships within the various components of the GeoN-
OMOS©, a common good is created and supported by an evolving 
and newly expanding set of  state best practices. African nations 
would find themselves in a very unique leadership position in history 
 
includes human capital development and utilization and the intentional formation and 
support of social capital.  
 100.  Supra, Note 57. 
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–  to shape new forms of participatory democracy based on individual 
liberty and then, to create an ‘enterprise of law’ defining how private 
and public actors [economic traders from domestic, regional, interna-
tional sectors] could better intersect with the state’s core functions 
without destabilizing it.  Within a proposed deeper engagement with 
sovereignty, one that lies inside the framework of liberty , the nation-
state moves beyond the neoliberal paradigm [c.1980-2010] of global 
capitalism and into a more “humanizing” paradigm for globaliza-
tion—one based on new economic organizing principles akin to those 
proposed by Rodrik, Reich, Kaletsky and others. As the state and all 
of its constituent groups learn to respectfully function within the 
GeoNOMOS©, the principles of mutual benefit, human dignity and 
liberty emerge. The social contract that was repeatedly espoused in 
the African 2016-2017 election cycle could become a fundamental 
and functional reality in the day-to-day lives of those citizens the 
state seeks of govern. 
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